iykyka/core-backend/main.go

802 lines
26 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/hex"
"net/http"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/gorilla/websocket"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
var upgrader = websocket.Upgrader{
CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool { return true },
}
type signupRequest struct {
InviteCode string `json:"invite_code" binding:"required"`
DisplayName string `json:"display_name" binding:"required"`
}
type sendMessageRequest struct {
SenderID uint `json:"sender_id" binding:"required"`
Text string `json:"text" binding:"required"`
SenderMode SenderMode `json:"sender_mode"`
// Approved represents the human tapping "승인" on an L1 draft, or on an
// L2 draft outside the whitelist (PRD.md §2.2). Ignored for
// human-authored messages.
Approved bool `json:"approved"`
}
type updateTwinSettingsRequest struct {
AutonomyLevel AutonomyLevel `json:"autonomy_level" binding:"required"`
// RelationshipTier is optional so existing autonomy-only PATCH calls
// keep working unchanged (roadmap.md §2.7-B). Nil = leave it as-is.
RelationshipTier *RelationshipTier `json:"relationship_tier"`
}
type createWhitelistRuleRequest struct {
ContactID *uint `json:"contact_id"`
TopicKeyword string `json:"topic_keyword" binding:"required"`
}
type draftMessageRequest struct {
ContextLines []string `json:"context_lines" binding:"required"`
StyleExamples []string `json:"style_examples"`
History []string `json:"history"`
K int `json:"k"`
}
// corsMiddleware allows Flutter Web (and other local origins) to call the API.
// Browsers treat http://localhost:5555 and http://127.0.0.1:8080 as different
// origins, so Chrome signup fails without OPTIONS + Allow-Origin headers.
func corsMiddleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
origin := c.GetHeader("Origin")
if origin == "" {
origin = "*"
}
c.Header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin)
c.Header("Vary", "Origin")
c.Header("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
c.Header("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type, Authorization, X-Requested-With")
c.Header("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, OPTIONS")
c.Header("Access-Control-Max-Age", "600")
if c.Request.Method == http.MethodOptions {
c.AbortWithStatus(http.StatusNoContent)
return
}
c.Next()
}
}
func setupRouter(db *gorm.DB, relay *ConnectionManager, ai *AIServiceClient) *gin.Engine {
r := gin.Default()
r.Use(corsMiddleware())
r.GET("/health", func(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"status": "ok"})
})
registerA1A2Routes(r, db)
registerBRoutes(r, db)
registerInviteOpsRoutes(r, db)
registerDemoRoutes(r)
registerGroupSummaryRoutes(r, db, ai)
r.GET("/admin/metrics", func(c *gin.Context) {
if !requireAdmin(c) {
return
}
// v1-minimal (roadmap.md §2.6): only counts honestly derivable from
// the current schema. Draft-generation latency and AI-service error
// rate need a request-timing/logging layer that doesn't exist yet --
// not fabricated here, left for that future work.
var usersTotal, humanMessages, twinMessages, escalationsTotal int64
var conversationsTotal, conversationsVetoed, invitesMinted, invitesUsed int64
db.Model(&User{}).Count(&usersTotal)
db.Model(&Message{}).Where("sender_mode = ?", SenderHuman).Count(&humanMessages)
db.Model(&Message{}).Where("sender_mode = ?", SenderTwin).Count(&twinMessages)
db.Model(&EscalationLog{}).Count(&escalationsTotal)
db.Model(&Conversation{}).Count(&conversationsTotal)
db.Model(&Conversation{}).Where("twin_disabled_by_peer = ?", true).Count(&conversationsVetoed)
db.Model(&InviteCode{}).Count(&invitesMinted)
db.Model(&InviteCode{}).Where("used_at IS NOT NULL").Count(&invitesUsed)
type reasonCount struct {
Reason string
Count int64
}
var reasonCounts []reasonCount
db.Model(&EscalationLog{}).Select("reason, count(*) as count").Group("reason").Scan(&reasonCounts)
escalationsByReason := map[string]int64{}
for _, rc := range reasonCounts {
escalationsByReason[rc.Reason] = rc.Count
}
var peerVetoRate float64
if conversationsTotal > 0 {
peerVetoRate = float64(conversationsVetoed) / float64(conversationsTotal)
}
rt := runtimeMetrics.snapshot()
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"users_total": usersTotal,
"messages_human_total": humanMessages,
"messages_twin_total": twinMessages,
"escalations_total": escalationsTotal,
"escalations_by_reason": escalationsByReason,
"conversations_total": conversationsTotal,
"conversations_vetoed": conversationsVetoed,
// Approximates vision.md's "와카뷰 거부율" metric at conversation
// granularity (vetoed conversations / all conversations) --
// vision.md doesn't pin down the exact denominator, so treat
// this as a first approximation, not the final definition.
"peer_veto_rate": peerVetoRate,
// Process-local draft/AI timings (roadmap B). Reset on restart.
"draft_requests": rt.DraftRequests,
"draft_errors": rt.DraftErrors,
"draft_error_rate": rt.DraftErrorRate,
"draft_latency_avg_ms": rt.DraftLatencyAvgMs,
"draft_latency_max_ms": rt.DraftLatencyMaxMs,
"draft_latency_samples": rt.DraftLatencySamples,
"escalate_checks": rt.EscalateChecks,
"escalate_errors": rt.EscalateErrors,
"escalate_error_rate": rt.EscalateErrorRate,
"twin_sends_blocked": rt.TwinSendsBlocked,
"push_attempts": rt.PushAttempts,
"push_skipped": rt.PushSkipped,
"push_delivered": rt.PushDelivered,
"invites_minted": invitesMinted,
"invites_used": invitesUsed,
})
})
r.POST("/auth/signup", func(c *gin.Context) {
var req signupRequest
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"detail": err.Error()})
return
}
// 초대 기반 베타(roadmap.md §2.6): 가입은 누군가 실제로 발급한 미사용
// 코드가 있어야만 된다 -- 아무 문자열이나 처음 쓰면 통과되던 이전
// 방식은 "초대 기반"이 아니었음.
//
// Shared demo: DEMO-YKAVU (ALLOW_DEMO_INVITE, default on) can be reused
// by multiple testers; User.InviteCode still gets a unique stored value.
demo := demoInviteEnabled() && isDemoInviteCode(req.InviteCode)
var invite InviteCode
storedInvite := req.InviteCode
if demo {
var err error
invite, err = demoSignupInviteCode(db)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"detail": err.Error()})
return
}
storedInvite, err = uniqueDemoUserInvite()
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"detail": err.Error()})
return
}
} else {
if err := db.Where("code = ?", req.InviteCode).First(&invite).Error; err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"detail": "invalid invite code"})
return
}
if ok, detail := inviteUsable(invite, time.Now()); !ok {
status := http.StatusBadRequest
if detail == "invite code already used" {
status = http.StatusConflict
}
c.JSON(status, gin.H{"detail": detail})
return
}
}
user := User{InviteCode: storedInvite, DisplayName: req.DisplayName}
if err := db.Create(&user).Error; err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"detail": err.Error()})
return
}
db.Create(&TwinSettings{UserID: user.ID, AutonomyLevel: AutonomyL0, RelationshipTier: RelationshipFormal})
if !demo {
now := time.Now()
invite.UsedAt = &now
invite.UsedByUserID = &user.ID
db.Save(&invite)
}
session, err := createSession(db, user.ID)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"detail": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"id": user.ID,
"display_name": user.DisplayName,
"token": session.Token,
"expires_at": session.ExpiresAt,
})
})
r.POST("/conversations/:id/messages", func(c *gin.Context) {
convID, ok := parseUintParam(c, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
var conversation Conversation
if err := db.First(&conversation, convID).Error; err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"detail": "conversation not found"})
return
}
var req sendMessageRequest
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"detail": err.Error()})
return
}
if req.SenderMode == "" {
req.SenderMode = SenderHuman
}
// Hard gate: a twin-authored send is an unattended action, so it
// must clear escalation_filter regardless of how it got here --
// this is the one chokepoint every twin auto-send passes through,
// so no client or upstream path can bypass it (AGENTS.md absolute
// safety invariants). Human-authored messages are the human's own
// words and are never gated. On any doubt (AI service unreachable
// or erroring) we fail closed and block the send. Peer veto is
// checked first (it's a total kill switch for this conversation,
// independent of content), then the group-chat block, then flood
// detection, then escalation, then autonomy level -- none of the
// later checks can override an earlier block.
if req.SenderMode == SenderTwin {
if conversation.TwinDisabledByPeer {
runtimeMetrics.recordTwinBlocked()
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"detail": "상대방이 와카뷰를 거부해서 이 대화방에서는 자동 발송이 꺼져 있습니다"})
return
}
// 단톡 따라잡기(PRD.md §2.3-③, roadmap.md §2.7-A): 이 시나리오는
// L0 고정, 자동 발송 없음 -- 사용자의 전역 자율성 레벨(L1/L2)과
// 무관하게 그룹 대화에서는 와카뷰 발송 자체를 막는다. 초안은
// 항상 사람이 검토해서 직접 보낸다.
if conversation.IsGroup {
runtimeMetrics.recordTwinBlocked()
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"detail": "그룹 대화에서는 와카뷰 자동 발송이 허용되지 않습니다 -- 초안만 생성하고 사람이 직접 보내세요"})
return
}
// 스팸/도배 감지 최소 버전(PRD.md §4, roadmap.md §2.7-C): 이미
// 도배로 중단된 대화방이면 재검사 없이 바로 막는다 (중복
// EscalationLog 방지 + 매 시도마다 카운트 쿼리를 다시 돌리지
// 않기 위함). 아직 중단되지 않았다면 이번 전송을 계기로 트리거를
// 검사한다 -- 이 게이트는 에스컬레이션 하드게이트와 같은 우회
// 불가 지점에 있어, 어떤 자율성 레벨/화이트리스트로도 건너뛸 수
// 없다.
if conversation.TwinDisabledByFlood {
runtimeMetrics.recordTwinBlocked()
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"detail": "도배 감지로 이 대화방의 와카뷰 자동 발송이 일시중단되어 있습니다 -- 사후 알림에서 확인 후 재개할 수 있습니다"})
return
}
if exceeded, count := floodDetected(db, convID, req.SenderID); exceeded {
conversation.TwinDisabledByFlood = true
db.Save(&conversation)
runtimeMetrics.recordTwinBlocked()
reason := floodReason(count)
db.Create(&EscalationLog{
UserID: req.SenderID,
ConversationID: convID,
Reason: reason,
MessageSnippet: req.Text,
})
// Automatic action -> post-hoc notification (AGENTS.md
// absolute safety invariants), same as the escalation gate
// below. Best-effort push (no-op without FCM_SERVER_KEY /
// real tokens).
_, _, _ = notifyUser(db, req.SenderID, "와카뷰 자동응대 일시중단", reason, map[string]string{
"type": "flood",
"conversation_id": strconv.FormatUint(uint64(convID), 10),
})
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"detail": "도배 감지로 자동 발송이 일시중단되었습니다", "reason": reason})
return
}
result, err := ai.checkEscalation(req.Text)
runtimeMetrics.recordEscalate(err)
if err != nil {
runtimeMetrics.recordTwinBlocked()
c.JSON(http.StatusBadGateway, gin.H{"detail": "escalation gate unavailable, twin send blocked: " + err.Error()})
return
}
if result.Escalate {
runtimeMetrics.recordTwinBlocked()
db.Create(&EscalationLog{
UserID: req.SenderID,
ConversationID: convID,
Reason: result.Reason,
MessageSnippet: req.Text,
})
// Best-effort push (no-op without FCM_SERVER_KEY / real tokens).
_, _, _ = notifyUser(db, req.SenderID, "와카뷰 확인 필요", result.Reason, map[string]string{
"type": "escalation",
"conversation_id": strconv.FormatUint(uint64(convID), 10),
"reason": result.Reason,
})
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"detail": "escalated", "reason": result.Reason})
return
}
// Autonomy gate (PRD.md §2.1/§2.2, tech-design.md §3): missing
// settings fail closed to L0, the documented default. roadmap.md
// §2.7-D: the level itself can be overridden per-contact (1:1
// only -- group conversations already returned above and never
// reach this point), so resolve it the same way relationship
// tier is resolved instead of reading only the global default.
level := resolveAutonomyLevel(db, req.SenderID, convID)
switch level {
case AutonomyL0:
runtimeMetrics.recordTwinBlocked()
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"detail": "L0(비서 모드)에서는 와카뷰 자동 발송이 허용되지 않습니다 -- 초안만 생성하고 사람이 직접 보내세요"})
return
case AutonomyL1:
if !req.Approved {
runtimeMetrics.recordTwinBlocked()
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"detail": "L1은 발송 전 사용자 승인이 필요합니다"})
return
}
case AutonomyL2:
if !req.Approved && !whitelistMatches(db, req.SenderID, convID, req.Text) {
runtimeMetrics.recordTwinBlocked()
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"detail": "화이트리스트에 없는 주제는 L1과 동일하게 사용자 승인이 필요합니다"})
return
}
default:
runtimeMetrics.recordTwinBlocked()
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"detail": "알 수 없는 자율성 레벨이라 발송을 차단합니다"})
return
}
}
message := Message{
ConversationID: convID,
SenderID: req.SenderID,
SenderMode: req.SenderMode,
Text: req.Text,
}
if err := db.Create(&message).Error; err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"detail": err.Error()})
return
}
relay.broadcast(convID, gin.H{
"type": "message",
"id": message.ID,
"sender_id": message.SenderID,
"sender_mode": message.SenderMode,
"text": message.Text,
})
// Return the full message so Flutter can render without waiting on WS.
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, messageJSON(message))
})
r.POST("/messages/:id/retract", func(c *gin.Context) {
msgID, ok := parseUintParam(c, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
var message Message
if err := db.First(&message, msgID).Error; err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"detail": "message not found"})
return
}
// One-tap undo (PRD.md §3.1, AGENTS.md "every automatic action needs
// post-hoc notification + one-tap undo") applies to unattended
// twin auto-sends -- a human retracting their own words is a
// different, unrelated feature this endpoint doesn't cover.
if message.SenderMode != SenderTwin {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"detail": "only twin-authored (auto-sent) messages can be retracted"})
return
}
if message.Retracted {
c.JSON(http.StatusConflict, gin.H{"detail": "message already retracted"})
return
}
message.Retracted = true
if err := db.Save(&message).Error; err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"detail": err.Error()})
return
}
relay.broadcast(message.ConversationID, gin.H{
"type": "retraction",
"id": message.ID,
})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"id": message.ID, "retracted": true})
})
r.POST("/conversations/:id/draft", func(c *gin.Context) {
convID, ok := parseUintParam(c, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
var conversation Conversation
if err := db.First(&conversation, convID).Error; err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"detail": "conversation not found"})
return
}
var req draftMessageRequest
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"detail": err.Error()})
return
}
if len(req.StyleExamples) == 0 && len(req.History) == 0 {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"detail": "provide style_examples or history"})
return
}
// 관계별 페르소나(roadmap.md §2.7-B): optional auth -- this endpoint
// has never required a session, so callers without one (existing
// tests, or a future anonymous path) still work exactly as before,
// just without tier resolution (falls back to "formal").
tier := RelationshipFormal
if actor, ok := currentUser(c, db, false); ok {
tier = resolveRelationshipTier(db, actor.ID, convID)
}
started := time.Now()
result, err := ai.requestDraft(draftRequest{
ContextLines: req.ContextLines,
RelationshipTier: string(tier),
StyleExamples: req.StyleExamples,
History: req.History,
K: req.K,
})
runtimeMetrics.recordDraft(time.Since(started), err)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadGateway, gin.H{"detail": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"status": result.Status, "text": result.Text})
})
r.POST("/conversations/:id/veto", func(c *gin.Context) {
convID, ok := parseUintParam(c, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
var conversation Conversation
if err := db.First(&conversation, convID).Error; err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"detail": "conversation not found"})
return
}
// Peer veto (PRD.md §3.1, tech-design.md §4, AGENTS.md absolute
// safety invariants): the counterpart asked to talk to the human
// only. One-way for v1 -- no "un-veto" endpoint, matching the
// PRD's "즉시 중단" wording; nothing in scope calls for reversing it.
conversation.TwinDisabledByPeer = true
if err := db.Save(&conversation).Error; err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"detail": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"conversation_id": convID, "twin_disabled_by_peer": true})
})
// 도배 감지로 자동 발송이 일시중단된 대화방을 다시 켠다 (roadmap.md
// §2.7-C, AGENTS.md "every automatic action needs post-hoc notification +
// one-tap undo"). 거부권(veto)과 달리 이 중단은 사람의 결정이 아니라
// 시스템이 자동으로 취한 조치라서, 되돌리기 경로가 반드시 있어야 한다 --
// 거부권처럼 영구적으로 막아두지 않는다.
r.POST("/conversations/:id/flood-reset", func(c *gin.Context) {
convID, ok := parseUintParam(c, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
var conversation Conversation
if err := db.First(&conversation, convID).Error; err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"detail": "conversation not found"})
return
}
conversation.TwinDisabledByFlood = false
if err := db.Save(&conversation).Error; err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"detail": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"conversation_id": convID, "twin_disabled_by_flood": false})
})
r.PATCH("/users/:id/twin-settings", func(c *gin.Context) {
userID, ok := parseUintParam(c, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
if !requireSelf(c, db, userID) {
return
}
var req updateTwinSettingsRequest
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"detail": err.Error()})
return
}
if !validAutonomyLevel(req.AutonomyLevel) {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"detail": "autonomy_level must be one of L0, L1, L2"})
return
}
if req.RelationshipTier != nil && !validRelationshipTier(*req.RelationshipTier) {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"detail": "relationship_tier must be one of close, formal"})
return
}
var settings TwinSettings
if err := db.Where("user_id = ?", userID).First(&settings).Error; err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"detail": "twin settings not found for user"})
return
}
settings.AutonomyLevel = req.AutonomyLevel
if req.RelationshipTier != nil {
settings.RelationshipTier = *req.RelationshipTier
}
if err := db.Save(&settings).Error; err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"detail": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"user_id": userID,
"autonomy_level": settings.AutonomyLevel,
"relationship_tier": settings.RelationshipTier,
})
})
r.POST("/users/:id/whitelist-rules", func(c *gin.Context) {
userID, ok := parseUintParam(c, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
if !requireSelf(c, db, userID) {
return
}
var user User
if err := db.First(&user, userID).Error; err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"detail": "user not found"})
return
}
var req createWhitelistRuleRequest
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"detail": err.Error()})
return
}
rule := WhitelistRule{UserID: userID, ContactID: req.ContactID, TopicKeyword: req.TopicKeyword}
if err := db.Create(&rule).Error; err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"detail": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"id": rule.ID,
"user_id": rule.UserID,
"contact_id": rule.ContactID,
"topic_keyword": rule.TopicKeyword,
})
})
r.GET("/users/:id/whitelist-rules", func(c *gin.Context) {
userID, ok := parseUintParam(c, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
if !requireSelf(c, db, userID) {
return
}
var user User
if err := db.First(&user, userID).Error; err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"detail": "user not found"})
return
}
var rules []WhitelistRule
db.Where("user_id = ?", userID).Order("id").Find(&rules)
out := make([]gin.H, 0, len(rules))
for _, rule := range rules {
out = append(out, gin.H{
"id": rule.ID,
"contact_id": rule.ContactID,
"topic_keyword": rule.TopicKeyword,
})
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"whitelist_rules": out})
})
r.DELETE("/users/:id/whitelist-rules/:ruleId", func(c *gin.Context) {
userID, ok := parseUintParam(c, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
if !requireSelf(c, db, userID) {
return
}
ruleID, ok := parseUintParam(c, "ruleId")
if !ok {
return
}
var rule WhitelistRule
if err := db.Where("id = ? AND user_id = ?", ruleID, userID).First(&rule).Error; err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"detail": "whitelist rule not found"})
return
}
db.Delete(&rule)
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"deleted": true})
})
r.DELETE("/users/:id", func(c *gin.Context) {
userID, ok := parseUintParam(c, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
if !requireSelf(c, db, userID) {
return
}
var user User
if err := db.First(&user, userID).Error; err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"detail": "user not found"})
return
}
// Right-to-erasure ("사용자가 언제든 초기화 가능", tech-design.md §5):
// wipes every row this user's ID appears on. Real chat history lives
// on-device first (tech-design.md §2/§5) -- the server only ever held
// a minimal relay copy, so deleting it here is not a partial erasure.
var messagesDeleted, escalationLogsDeleted int64
err := db.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
if res := tx.Model(&InviteCode{}).Where("used_by_user_id = ?", userID).Update("used_by_user_id", nil); res.Error != nil {
return res.Error
}
if res := tx.Where("user_id = ?", userID).Delete(&Session{}); res.Error != nil {
return res.Error
}
if res := tx.Where("user_id = ?", userID).Delete(&TwinSettings{}); res.Error != nil {
return res.Error
}
if res := tx.Where("user_id = ?", userID).Delete(&WhitelistRule{}); res.Error != nil {
return res.Error
}
if res := tx.Where("owner_user_id = ?", userID).Delete(&Contact{}); res.Error != nil {
return res.Error
}
if res := tx.Where("user_id = ?", userID).Delete(&ConversationParticipant{}); res.Error != nil {
return res.Error
}
res := tx.Where("sender_id = ?", userID).Delete(&Message{})
if res.Error != nil {
return res.Error
}
messagesDeleted = res.RowsAffected
res = tx.Where("user_id = ?", userID).Delete(&EscalationLog{})
if res.Error != nil {
return res.Error
}
escalationLogsDeleted = res.RowsAffected
return tx.Delete(&user).Error
})
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"detail": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"deleted_user_id": userID,
"messages_deleted": messagesDeleted,
"escalation_logs_deleted": escalationLogsDeleted,
})
})
r.GET("/ws/conversations/:id", func(c *gin.Context) {
convID, ok := parseUintParam(c, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
conn, err := upgrader.Upgrade(c.Writer, c.Request, nil)
if err != nil {
return
}
defer conn.Close()
relay.add(convID, conn)
defer relay.remove(convID, conn)
for {
if _, _, err := conn.ReadMessage(); err != nil {
break
}
}
})
return r
}
// whitelistMatches: keyword substring match, scoped by ContactID when set.
// Rules with ContactID == nil apply to any counterpart. Rules with a
// ContactID apply only when that contact is the peer in this conversation
// (resolved via Contact.ContactUserID ↔ other participant).
func whitelistMatches(db *gorm.DB, userID, conversationID uint, text string) bool {
var rules []WhitelistRule
db.Where("user_id = ?", userID).Find(&rules)
peerContactID := resolvePeerContactID(db, userID, conversationID)
for _, rule := range rules {
if !strings.Contains(text, rule.TopicKeyword) {
continue
}
if rule.ContactID == nil {
return true
}
if peerContactID != nil && *rule.ContactID == *peerContactID {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func generateInviteCode() (string, error) {
buf := make([]byte, 5)
if _, err := rand.Read(buf); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return hex.EncodeToString(buf), nil
}
func parseUintParam(c *gin.Context, name string) (uint, bool) {
id, err := strconv.ParseUint(c.Param(name), 10, 64)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"detail": name + " must be a positive integer"})
return 0, false
}
return uint(id), true
}
func main() {
if len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == "migrate" {
_ = openDB()
return
}
db := openDB()
seedDemoInvite(db)
relay := newConnectionManager()
ai := newAIServiceClient()
r := setupRouter(db, relay, ai)
r.Run(":8080")
}